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The Geopolitics
of Oil and Iraq

Issam al-Chalabi

The author deals only with the recent developments that will shape the
destiny of Iraq and determine whether it will remain a unified country or
disintegrate. He is not optimistic.
ince the discovery of oil in Persia in the late nineteenth century and in
Iraq at the beginning of the twentieth century, oil has been a focal point
in all major events in the Middle East. The distribution of oil in various
parts of the region was a major factor in defining the boundaries of the
newly established Arab states in order to safeguard the interests of the
major world powers after the fall of the Ottoman empire. There are numerous events, conflicts, and even wars in which oil was a central issue, if not
the sole issue. Moreover, its importance has grown over the years as the
world’s dependence on Middle East oil has increased. With two-thirds of the
world’s oil reserves and a third of its gas reserves, the Middle East, and
particularly the region surrounding the Arabian Gulf, has become vital for
the world and will remain so for many years to come.
My presentation today will only relate to Iraq, a country that has remained at the center of attention for many years due to the 1980–88 IraqIran war; the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, followed by the second
Gulf War; and the March 2003 downfall of Saddam Husain and his regime
at the hands of invading forces led by the United States. Whether or not oil
was the real target of that invasion will surely remain a subject of controversy for researchers and politicians for decades to come. One of the architects of the war, U.S. Defense Undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz, when asked
why the United States did not attack North Korea after it admitted to
possessing weapons of mass destruction, replied without hesitation: “Iraq
floats on oil.”
The Iraq war has become more controversial as virtually everything has
turned sour: the political process is deadlocked, security deteriorates year
after year and month after month, and the economy is in shambles, with
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unemployment reaching 51 percent and severe shortages of fuel, electricity,
water, and every other indicator. On top of that, the performance of the oil
industry has fallen short of the minimum expectations both upstream and
downstream.
The current status and future prospects of the Iraqi oil industry have been
discussed on many occasions, so today I would like to deal only with the
latest developments that will shape the destiny of Iraq and determine
whether it will remain a unified country or disintegrate. The interference,
interests, and influence of outside forces, particularly the United States as
the main player, and regional players such as Iran, will no doubt continue to
play a major role, but I would like to concentrate on internal geopolitics and
the conflicting agendas of the main factions and groups.
When Iraq’s draft constitution was promulgated in August 2006, I said
from this podium that “the relevant articles on the oil and gas industries
seem to contain the seeds for conflict and possible fragmentation.” That
was one of the main reasons for threats to boycott the October 15, 2005,
referendum, threats that were only averted after strong lobbying by the U.S.
administration and the insertion of Article 142, which cleared the way to
amend the constitution through the establishment of a parliamentary committee within four months of inauguration of the new parliament. It has
been [many] months since that date, and the deputies are still arguing about
the definition of the starting date.
This led to two major developments in the form of attempts to establish
controversial laws prior to any possible amendments to the constitution.
The first relates to the insistence of the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) on the full ownership, control, development, and operation of the oil
industry, both upstream and downstream, in accordance with its own
interpretation of the disputed articles on oil and gas. As an example, Article
111 of the constitution states that “oil and gas is the property of all the Iraqi
people in all the regions and provinces.” But the KRG says that such resources within Kurdish areas are owned only by the people of Kurdistan. It
also says that the regional parliament of Kurdistan is the sole legislative
authority over all petroleum operations in that region.
The KRG on August 7 published the draft of a proposed petroleum act
and followed it . . . with a final draft to be submitted for enactment. This
move came as a surprise to the central government, which was itself preparing a draft hydrocarbon law for the whole country in a ministerial committee headed by the deputy PM, Barham Salih who happens to be a leading
Kurdish figure and representing the Kurdish parties in the central government. Among other controversial articles in the Kurdish legislation, it is
stated that it will apply to all “disputed territories,” meaning the currently
producing Kirkuk, Mosul, and other oil fields as well as all other undeveloped fields. It clearly states that no law, contract, or license issued by the
central government can be applied without the explicit agreement of the
KRG.
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The Iraqi Oil Minister Husain al-Shahristani said [recently] that there
will be only one authority in control of oil resources. Yet there has so far
been no official reaction to the latest Kurdish move, and it remains unclear
what will be the fate of the draft hydrocarbon law that is supposed to be
finalized and submitted to the Iraqi parliament for legislation by the end of
the year. The KRG is continuing to sign production-sharing agreements for
blocks and structures under its control, as with DNO of Norway, Genel
Energi of Turkey, PetOil of Turkey, and Canada’s Western Oil Sands and
Heritage. In one of these agreements profit oil will be shared on a 51–49
percent basis and cost recovery oil could reach as high as 80–90 percent.
The second major development is politically motivated but is also focused
on the oil wealth in the southern part of Iraq. The Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), one of the main groups in the present
government, submitted to parliament [in September 2006] a controversial
draft law detailing the mechanism for establishing regional governments
similar to that in the Kurdish region. But this was strongly opposed by other
parties within the same coalition as well as other groups outside it. This is
being looked upon by some observers as a possible sign of national aspiration against the latest tide of sectarian motivations.
A federal region in the southern part of Iraq could encompass up to nine
provinces, including three oil-rich provinces — Basrah, Misan, and Thi-Qar
— which contain oil fields with proven reserves of nearly 80 billion barrels,
or over 70 percent of Iraq’s current proven reserves. These include undeveloped super giant oil fields such as West Qurna, Majnoon, Bin ‘Umar,
Halfaya, Nasiriya, and Ratawi, and nearly 30 other fields.
Currently, Iraq’s oil exports are limited to those from the Basrah oil fields
and some from Misan. These generate all the oil revenue on which the
central government depends. The mishandling of oil and oil products has
been known for some time but only came to light after the formation of the
new government in May of 2006. Reports of missing oil barrels, smuggling,
and mishandling of funds have been made public through various channels,
including inter alia official reports from the Inspector General of the Ministry of Oil and the Audit Board formed by representatives of the UN, IMF,
World Bank, and the Arab Fund. The report of the Inspector General of the
Ministry of Oil listed seven illegal berthing facilities used for smuggling oil
products that had cost Iraq nearly $1.5 billion. The Audit Board talks about
hundreds of millions of dollars misplaced or missing.
The current Iraqi National Security Advisor, Muaffaq al-Ruba’i, said on
June 14 [2006] that oil is at the heart of much of the heavy fighting around
Basrah. “These oil fields are the richest in Iraq and constitute all the current
Iraqi exports,” he said. “If you don’t understand what’s happening there,
follow the dollar sign. There is a 6,000 barrels per day difference between
the level of production for exports and the level of actual exports. It goes
into the pockets of warlords, organized crime, and political parties.” This
figure for missing barrels is, in fact, much lower than estimates by other
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sources, but even at this level it adds up to nearly $130 million over and
above the $1.5 billion for smuggling and mishandling of imported oil products in the official ministry report.
In conclusion, I would like to make a reference to my presentation a year
ago at this conference, which some participants thought was rather pessimistic. The figures for production and exports were as I predicted. For the
first eight months of 2006, production was 2.090 million barrels per day
compared to the 2 million barrels per day I predicted, with exports averaging 1.506 million barrels per day compared to 1.5 million barrels per day. As
for the future, I do not think that 3.5 million barrels per day will be attained
before 2009–10 or that 6 million barrels per day will be reached before
2012 at best.
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